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I.

THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT THE STATE'S CURRENT
POSITION ON THE PCRA.
The State's current overall contention is that \Vynn's motions under 30(b),

22(e) and 60(b) seek to circumvent the long-expired time limits of the PCRA, and
that the trial court was correct in so ruling. State's brief at 16, 18. Actually, the trial
court did not rule that the time bar of the PCRA would bar Wynn's claims. Rather,
the court ruled that the availability of relief under the PCRA precluded Wynn's
resorting to rule 60(b) for relief~- 507-08). The trial court was led to rule in this
fashion by the State's position below, that rather than seeking relief under the court
rules, \Vynn should pursue withdrawal of his pleas under the PCRA. See R. 394, 398400, 463, R. 544: 10, 16. Rather than arguing that Wynn's claims were time-barred
under the PCRA, the State successfully led the trial court to believe and rule that the
PCRA was "applicable to address Defendant's allegations" and an available remedy
for Wynn that foreclosed his resorting to 60(b) (R. 506-508 and n.2). See State's
brief at 15 (acknowledging that the attorney general's office argued that \Vynn had to
proceed and could seek discovery through the PCRA, and that the trial court ruled
that Wynn could only seek relief through the PCRA).
Utah law recognizes that the State, like other parties on appeal, is not allowed
to raise new issues it waived in the trial court. E.g., State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132,
1138-39 (Utah 1989) (declining to address Fourth Amendment standing issue that the
State did not raise in trial court or on appeal). Our law recognizes that estoppel
applies against the government when there are "very specific written representations

by authorized government entities," when the facts can be found with certainty and
the injustice that would otherwise result is "of sufficient gravity" to allow for
assertion of estoppel against the government. Anderson v. Public Service
Commission, 839 P.2d 822, 827-28 (Utah 1992).
This Court should not adopt the State's current position, as it is inconsistent
with the written position the Assistant Attorney General took below, is designed to
prejudice Wynn's ability to obtain relief from the Courts, and was waived in the trial
court.
The plea bargain agreement the Attorney General's Office entered into in the
first place was that Wynn would serve only five years in federal prison and that he
would serve no time in state prison, as "any" state prison time would run
concurrently with \Vynn's five-year federal sentence (R. 130,179-80, 182-183).
Contrary to the State's position, particularly as it was articulated in the trial court,
Wynn is not trying to withdraw his guilty pleas, and is not and should not be required
to do so under the PCRA. He has already served more prison time than was
contemplated in his agreement with the State. He should be allowed to enforce the
terms of the original agreement by correcting his illegal sentence under rule 30(6),
22(e) and/ or 60(6).

II.

THE RESTITUTION ORDER SHOULD BE CORRECTED
UNDER 30(B).
While it reiterates the court's error, the State makes no effort to defend Judge

Parker's clearly erroneous ruling that the restitution involved no error as it reflected
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what was intended by the parties and the court - that Judge Reese would enter an
order for "'full and complete' restitution." (R. 508). Compare Wynn's opening brief
at 15-17 with the State's brief passim. The State makes no effort to defend Judge
Parker's clearly erroneous ruling that there is nothing in the record to counter that the
restitution order carried out the court's and parties' intent. Compare Wynn's opening
brief at 17-18 with State's brief passim.
The State claims that the legal error in the restitution order, which includes
amounts for people who are not victims of the counts pied to, or victims of any
count, is a judicial error reflecting legally erroneous judicial reasoning, not a clerical
one correctible under 30(b). State's brief at 16, 20, 22. The State also argues that
Wynn is not entitled to relief from clerical error under 30(b), because he has not
shown a mathematical error in the calculation of restitution. State's brief at 16, 19,
21.

The State's interpretation of 30(6), as if mathematical errors qualify as clerical
errors, whereas legal errors do not, is legally incorrect. Under the law interpreting

30(6), an error is clerical if an order does not reflect the intent or judicial reasoning of
the court, or the intent of the court and the parties. E.g.. State v. Rodrigues, 2009 UT

62, ,r 15, 218 P.3d 610.
Here, the intent of the court was to impose an order of restitution that was
agreed upon by the parties (R. 543: 3, 5). The final order here was not agreed upon,
but was instead defaulted on by trial counsel for \Vynn. See R. 135, State's brief at
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10. And the default did not square with the intent of\Xlynn - to pay restitution for
the counts pled to (R. 543; 3, 5, R. 130, 186).
Similarly to the order in Rodrigues, there was no judicial reasoning involved in
the entry of the restitution order; the court simply signed the order defaulted on by
Wynn's trial counsel, without having any underlying data with which to reason.
Assuming it were necessary to prove mathematical error, the final order of
restitution in the amount of $782, 036.00 does not account for the $100,000 Wynn
paid when he pled guilty, as the trial court and plea agreement intended (R. 543: 3, 5).
This is a mathematical error that deviated from the intent of the court and the parties.
It qualifies for relief even under the State's unduly limited view of relief available
under 30(6). That Judge Parker now interprets that order as if it reflected the amount
Wynn paid, and that the hearing officer for the board of pardons credited Wynn for
paying $100,000, State's brief at 31 n.7, do not change the facts that the order on its
face requires \Xlynn to pay the full amount without accounting for the $100,000
already paid (R. 141-147), as does the Board of Pardons' current order (R. 362).
After claiming the absence of mathematical error, he State notes discrepancies
between the order and the charging information upon which \Xlynn relies in
discussing amounts owed, and claims that the restitution order reflects the more
accurate "updated" amounts. State's brief at 24. There is no record support for the
proposition that the restitution order is updated or more accurate than the
information and the sworn probable cause affidavit upon which Wynn relies (R. 1138). The State has consistently denied Wynn discovery on how restitution was
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calculated (R. 454-55) and the original prosecutor and defense counsel have not
responded to the inquiries of present counsel for \Vynn. (R. 544:7). The Court
should reject the State's complaint that Wynn has shown no mathematical error in
these circumstances.
The State argues as if Wynn agreed to pay "many times more" than $100,000
in restitution "to his securities fraud victims." State's brief at 1, 23. The record
illuminates the State's representation as to the amount \Vynn agreed to pay. This
relevant portion of the colloquy was as follows:
THE COURT: I'll also order that you pay full and complete restitution
in an amount of at least $100,000, but probably as your attorney, I think in his
words, were many times more than that, but the two of you will agree on a
figure that will be presented at the time you surrender. Is that what you
understand?
MR. WYNN: Yes, Sir.

(R. 543: 3). Wynn agreed to pay what his attorney agreed upon, at least $100,000.
The State does not explain how Wynn's purported agreement to pay "his
securities fraud victims" would allow for a restitution order including hundreds of
thousands of dollars for people who are not even victims in the state criminal case,
and for people who are victims of counts not pled to (R. 134-147). And as the State
sometimes acknowledges, ~ State's brief at 9, Wynn's actual agreement was for his
lawyer to reach an agreement on the amount of restitution by October 6, 2008, the
date Wynn was to report to federal prison, and that the amount would be at least
$100,000 for the victims of the counts he pled to (R. 543; 3, 5, R. 130, 186). The
default order requiring Wynn to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars to people who
are not named victims of any of the charges, let alone the counts pled to, and
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requiring Wynn to again pay the $100,000 he paid when he pled guilty, does not
square with Wynn's agreement.
The State argues as if Wynn's statement before the hearing officer for the
board of pardons that the restitution figure of $782,000 "sounds correct" affirms the
accuracy of the court's restitution order. State's brief at 2, 24-25. But as the State at
times acknowledges, State's brief at 11, Wynn made this statement when he was
denied access to the information underlying that figure (R. 339-340). 1
The State argues that because there is no contrary evidence, this Court must
assume that counsel for Wynn reasonably opted to permit the entry of the restitution
order because it was accurate. State's brief at 25. The State also argues that
"everything in the record" supports the conclusion that trial counsel did not object to
The actual discussion was as follows:
HEARING OFFICER: Okay. So at this point I have restitution is owed in
the amount of $782,068.63. It says $100,000 of this has been paid, and there's
a balance of $682,068; is that correct?
:MR. WYNN: I don't-I haven't seen those figures, it sounds correct.
HEARING OFFICER: Well, they were in the blue packet.
MR. WYNN: They're not in the blue packet that I have. They may have been
in the original blue packet, but that original blue packet was sent HEARING OFFICER: Have you paid more than $100,000?
1-'IR. WYNN: Not that I'm aware of.
HEARING OFFICER: Okay. Did you pay the $100,000?
MR. WYNN: Yes.
HEARING OFFICER: Okay. So as I look over the victims, it looks like
there were 20 separate victims with losses ranging from 7,000 to $107,000
each.
1-'IR. WYNN: And I don't have the - I don't have that in my blue packet, so Hearing officer: Well, I can't give you the victim's addresses for mailing
purposes. Okay. So any of that information that you want to add upon, or
does that pretty well sum it up?
:MR. WYNN: I think that sums it up.
(R. 339-340).

1
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the restitution order because it was correct. Id. at 25. There is evidence contrary to
the State's desired assumption in the record: Wynn's declaration reflects that his
agreement was to pay restitution only to the victims of the counts pled to (R. 186).
The State had every opportunity to present a counter-declaration from \Vynn's trial
counsel or the trial prosecutor and never did so.
As in Rodrigues, the State submitted incorrect restitution amounts that were
not contested by trial counsel for the defendant. The State's errors were not the
product of judicial reasoning or intent, and the court's adoption of the State's errors
was not the deliberate result of the court's judicial reasoning or intent and did not
reflect the parties' intent, as the court intended. The errors are thus subject to
correction as clerical errors under 30(6). Id. ,i,i 25-27.

III.

THE RESTITUTION ORDER AND ILLEGALLY IMPOSED
SENTENCE SHOULD BE CORRECTED UNDER 22(E).
The State contends that there is no evidence that the parties and court

intended that Wynn serve no time in the state prison, and that this Court should thus
presume that trial counsel acted reasonably in not protecting Wynn from the
possibility of serving time in the state prison. State's brief at 39 n.8. Wynn's
declaration (181-187), the declaration of the federal prosecutor who negotiated the
state and federal cases in a global agreement with the state prosecutor and counsel for
Wynn (R. 179-180), and the plea form reflecting that "any" state prison time would
run concurrently with Wynn's federal five year sentence (R. 130) all prove that the
agreement was that Wynn would serve only the five year sentence in federal prison.
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The absence of a declaration by trial counsel or the trial prosecutor is the result of
their not responding to the inquiries of present counsel for Wynn (R. 544: 7). The
State certainly had every opportunity to present whatever proof it had to counter
Wynn's factual contentions in the declarations of Wynn and the federal prosecutor
proving that the agreement was for \Vynn to spend five years in federal prison and
then be free working to earn restitution, and presented nothing. Instead, it refused to
provide discovery on the details of the plea bargaining (R. 445; 454-455).
Consistent with its argument that there was no agreement for Wynn to serve
time only in federal prison, the State argues as if Judge Reese delayed issuing the
commitment in the State case to ensure that the state sentence ran concurrently with
the federal. State's brief at 8. The record actually demonstrates that Judge Reese
ordered all sentences to run concurrently and agreed to delay signing the
commitment until after \Vynn went to federal prison (R. 543: 2-5). The state
sentence was imposed after the federal, and the concurrent effect of the sentence was
established and guaranteed by his ruling regardless of when the commitment was
signed. The only function of delaying the imposition of sentence was to ensure that
Wynn went to federal prison, not state.
The State contends that Wynn is truly challenging the legality of his pleas,
because he misunderstood the value of the plea agreement when he entered them,
and argues as if the only way the trial court could give effect to his understanding
would have been to change the pleas from second degree felonies to third degree
felonies. State's brief at 38-39. While Wynn certainly has an argument that his
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misunderstanding of the nature and value of the bargain induced his pleas, he should
not be forced into withdrawal of the pleas in this case wherein he has already served
more time than he should have under the terms of the agreement.
\°'Q'ynn has independent claims that his trial lawyer was ineffective in the
sentencing process, in failing to ensure that the federal five-year sentence was the
only prison time Wynn would serve, by requesting a reduction of the convictions to
third degree felonies pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 76-3-402 or by requesting
probation on the State case. \Vynn also has an independent claim of ineffective
assistance by virtue of counsel's defaulting his right to accuracy in the restitution
portion of his sentence. These claims establish illegality in the manner the sentence
was imposed and are correctible under the plain language of the second clause of rule
22(e). 2 Compare State v. Apadaca, 2015 UT App 212, ,r,r 9-11, 358 P.3d 1124 (the
Court considered whether the trial court violated Apadaca's right to allocution at
sentencing before finding that his sentence was not imposed in an illegal manner
under 22(e)).
The State claims that Wynn proffered nothing to show that counsel was
objectively deficient in failing to object to the restitution award, and that absent
contrary evidence, the Court should presume that counsel's performance was
reasonable. State's brief at 40 n.9. There is evidence contrary to the State's desired
presumption in the record: Wynn's declaration reflects that his agreement was to pay
We interpret our court rules according to standard principles of statutory
construction and give effect to all parts of our rules. E.g., Cox v. Krammer, 2003 UT
App 264, ,r 10, 76 P.3d 184. We give heed to their plain language. See,~ Hartford
Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 697 (Utah App. 1994).
2
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restitution only to the victims of the counts pled to and did not encompass payments
for other victims in the charges and other people outside of the case (R. 186). The
State had every opportunity to present a counter-declaration from Wynn's trial
counsel or the trial prosecutor and never did so. Accordingly the record disproves
that counsel's default was objectively reasonable.
The State makes no effort to defend Judge Parker's clearly erroneous factual
finding that the restitution payees were all among the victims underlying the counts in
this case (R. 506). Compare \Vynn's opening brief at 29-30 with State's brief passim.
Nor does the State seek to defend Judge Parker's contradictory rulings that the
court had no jurisdiction to act under 22(e), yet the availability of 22(e) foreclosed
Wynn's resorting to 60(6) (R. 506 n.2). Compare Wynn's opening brief at 28-29 with
State's brief passim.
While it echoes the incorrect reasoning in its brief,~ State's brief at 9,
the State does not defend Judge Parker's legal reasoning that the parties would have
to affirmatively limit restitution to the victims underlying the counts pled to for such
a limitation to be legally cognizable (R. 506). Compare Wynn's opening brief at 31-32
with State's brief passim.
While it echoes the erroneous reasoning, State's brief at 31 n. 7, the State does
not contest that Judge Parker was factually incorrect in reading the default restitution
order as if it accounted for the $100,000 payment. Compare Wynn's opening brief at
31 with State's brief passim.
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The State contends that Wynn is not entitled to relief under rule 22(e), because
his sentence is legal, and to the extent it was imposed illegally through ineffective
assistance of counsel, this is not subject to correction under 22(e) because claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel are not "facial" challenges, as they would have to be
to be corrected under 22(e). State's brief at 31-39. In making this argument, the
State relies heavily on State v. Houston, 2015 UT 36, 353 P.3d 55, a decision that was
issued after Wynn's 22(e) motion was filed, and which held that 22(e) illegal sentence
claims are limited to true legal challenges to sentences, as opposed to fact intensive
challenges to underlying convictions. See id. at ifif26-27.
Contrary to the State's argument on page 40 of its brief, the restitution order
portion of Wynn's sentence certainly contains clear-cut facial legal error, as it requires
Wynn to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars to people who are not even victims of
the case charged, let alone victims of the counts he pled to in the absence of an
agreement to justify restitution beyond that payable to the victims of the counts pled
to. And the restitution order does not account for the $100,000 Wynn paid at the
time he pled. This does not square with basic Utah law, which permits restitution to
be ordered for extant debts attributable to criminal convictions unless there is an
agreement to pay more. See,~' State v. Larsen, 2009 UT App 293, 221 P.3d 277;
Utah Code Ann. 77-38a-302. Thus the illegal sentence is correctible under 22(e).
With regard to trial counsel's failure to seek a sentence that would embody the
agreement that Wynn serve only five years in federal prison, the State contends that
fact intensive challenges involved in claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not
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properly resolved under 22(e). State's brief at 37. The facts underlying this claim
have been thoroughly documented by \Vynn and have never been contested by the
State. Thus, there is no fact-intensive analysis required in resolving Wynn's
ineffective assistance claims. His legal claims regarding his counsel's ineffective
assistance in the sentencing process, both with regard to the default restitution order,
and with regard to counsel's failure to ensure that Wynn served no time in the state
prison, are procedural errors in sentencing that are properly resolved under 22(e)'s
remedy for sentences imposed "in an illegal manner." Cf. Apadaca, supra. See also
State v. Samora, 2004 UT 79, ,r 13, 99 P.3d 858 (sentence imposed in violation of
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) was imposed in an illegal manner and thus subject to
correction under 22(e)).

IV.

THE RESTITUTION ORDER SHOULD BE CORRECTED
UNDER 60(B).
A.

THE PCRA DOES NOT FORECLOSE 60(B) RELIEF FROM
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT.

The State's current position is that the PCRA governs Wynn's claims, and that
Wynn cannot proceed under 60(6) because his claims would be time-barred under the
PCRA. State's brief at 42-43. The State never contended below that the PCRA
would bar Wynn's claims for relief. Rather, the State repeatedly argued as if Wynn
should be pursuing relief by challenging his pleas under the PCRA (~ R. 394, 463).
As explained in Point I, this Court should not permit but should estop the State's
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effort to take a position on appeal that is inconsistent with its position below, and
would prejudice Wynn.
The State does not defend the trial court's ruling that the availability of the
PCRA to address Wynn's claims foreclosed his resorting to 60(b)(6) (R. 507-08). This
is likely because the State has changed positions on appeal, to now argue that the
PCRA time bar would likely block Wynn from obtaining relief under the PCRA.
State's brief at 43.
The State argues that the trial court properly ruled that Wynn could not resort
to 60(b), as this would evade the time bar of the PCRA. State's brief at 17-18, 41-44.
Actually, as detailed above, the State succeeded in leading the trial court to believe
and rule that Wynn should proceed under the PCRA, and that the availability of that
remedy disallowed him from proceeding under 60(b). Particularly as to default
orders, 60(6) remains a viable remedy for claims of gross ineffective assistance of
counsel, such as occurred here, and such as continues to prejudice Mr. Wynn.
Like the trial court, the State does not acknowledge the portion of Kell v.
State, 2012 UT 25, ,I 25, 285 P.3d 1133, wherein Kell reiterates that default
judgments are generally properly set aside under 60(6)(6). Id. at ,I 19. The restitution
award is certainly a default judgment, as it requires Wynn to pay hundreds of
thousands of dollars to people who were not victims of the counts pled to (141-147),
when Wynn agreed only to pay restitution to the victims of the counts pled to (R.
186), and the record indisputably shows that Wynn's trial counsel did not respond
when the State submitted the incorrect order to counsel or the court (R. 135). Thus,
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60(b) relief is available to Wynn for counsel's gross ineffective assistance in his
wholesale forfeiture of Wynn's right to an accurate determination of restitution. For
when an attorney entirely forfeits a criminal defendant's procedural rights, this is
ineffective assistance as a matter of law, as prejudice is presumed. See,~' Williams
v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 392-93 (2000); Hill v. Lockart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985);
Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, iJiJ 99-100, 150 P.3d 480.

B.

WYNN'S 60(B) CHALLENGE TO THE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT WAS TIMELY FILED.

The State argues that the trial court was correct in ruling that Wynn did not
appear to have acted diligently in filing the 60(b) motion, because Wynn learned the
total amount of restitution owed in 2013 during his second parole hearing, and did
not begin challenging the restitution order until January of 2015. State's brief at 4447. The court's ruling was that Wynn had not explained why his motion was not filed
sooner (R. 507). Accord State's brief at 47 n.12 (recognizing the court's actual ruling
that Wynn did not explain the delay). As the State does not contest, the court's ruling
was clearly erroneous, for Wynn did explain that Wynn was relying on his trial
counsel to have addressed the restitution issues, and did not learn until December of
2014 that counsel had defaulted on the restitution order in state court, and failed to
object to the order, which requires Wynn to pay restitution to people who were not
named in the criminal case, and who were not victims of the offenses to which he
pled, and were thus beyond his expectation that he would be paying restitution only
to the victims of the counts pled to (R. 181-187). The State faults Wynn for not
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learning sooner of the details of the default judgment, id., failing to recognize that
\Vynn was constitutionally entitled to rely on the guiding hand of his counsel in the
underlying criminal case. E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
Once \Vynn learned that counsel had defaulted on the restitution issue, he did act,
and file a comprehensive morion for relief under 22(e) within three months (R. 167368). And after the Houston decision came down, he augmented his 22(e) claim
under rules 30(b) and 60(6) (R. 440-444).
The State suggests that 60(b)'s reasonable diligence requirement should bar
Wynn's efforts to correct the restitution award, as he has laid in wait with this claim
to unfairly lull the State and victims into believing the order was final, resting assured
that the corrected order would be lower due to document spoilage. State's brief at
48. There is no record support for this argument, as \Vynn raised the claim as soon
as he was aware of it, and the State has never previously complained or suggested that
its documents have spoiled. Wynn sits in prison because he cannot pay the
enormous restitution and has no incentive to wait to raise the claim. He was not
aware of the default order or its contents until December of 2014.
The State claims that it has an interest in the finality of Wynn's sentence and
would be prejudiced if the restitution order were set aside, as the State bargained for
Wynn to pay full restitution in an amount many times more than the $100,000 he
paid when he pled. State's brief at 47-48. 3 The State's position in this regard is
founded on its misreading of the plea colloquy as if \Vynn was thereby bound to pay
3

It is noteworthy that the State is not claiming that specific amount listed in the
current restitution order reflects what Wynn agreed to pay.
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some amount multiple times greater than $100,000 to people who were not victims of
the counts he pled to, and were not victims in his state case at all. As detailed above,
the plea colloquy established no such thing (R. 543: 3). The undisputed record
establishes that Wynn agreed to pay restitution only to the victims named in the
counts pled to (R. 186).
The State argues that it is serving the State's interest by acting ethically and
honestly in trying to hold Wynn to the letter and spirit of the plea agreement. State's
brief at 49. 4 The agreement was that \Vynn would serve five years in federal prison
and then be free to earn the restitution he owed to the victims of the counts he pled
to. This is proved by the plea form (R. 130), by Wynn's declaration (R. 181-188), by
the declaration of the former federal prosecutor (R. 179-180), and by the fact that
Judge Reese delayed signing Wynn's commitment until after he went to federal prison

(R. 543 1-5). The State has never countered this with any evidence, despite having
had the opportunity to do so (e.g. R. 450-51), and has refused to provide discovery
concerning the details of the plea agreement and restitution issues (R. 445; 454-455).
Under the order of the Board of Pardons (R. 358-362), Wynn sits in state
prison, where he never should have been under the terms of the State's agreement (R.
179-188), until he is able to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars he legally does not
owe under the terms of the agreement (R. 186) and the governing law, ~ State v.

In quoting Wynn's argument, the State apparently does not recognize the word
integriously, and follows it with "[sic]." State's brief at 49. A person is integrious,
and acts integriously, when that person's actions are marked with integrity. E.g.
http:/ /www.grammarphobia.com/blog/2009 /09 / an-adjective-with-integrity.html.
4
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Larsen, 2009 UT App 293,221 P.3d 277; Utah Code Ann. 77-38a-302, and is unable
to pay (R. 181-188).
The State led the trial court to believe that Wynn's remedy for his
predicament is withdrawal of his pleas through the PCRA (R. 394, 398-400, 463, R.
544: 10, 16; R. 506-508 and n.2), and on appeal now argues as if the trial court ruled
correctly that he has no remedy under the PCRA (State's brief at 16-18). The State
maintains that Wynn should stay in the prison unable to earn or pay restitution at all,
as this serves the State's interest in finality, and that otherwise the State would be
prejudiced (State's brief at 48-49).
The State's efforts to honestly and ethically uphold the letter and spirit of the
plea agreement are required by our federal constitutional guarantee of due process of
law. See,~ United States v. Cudjoe, 534 F.3d 1349, 1356 (10 th Cir. 2008) (finding
that government violated both the letter and spirit of the plea agreement, in violation
of Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)). The State's course of action in
the trial court and on appeal, in obfuscating the nature of the plea agreement, in
denying Wynn access to discovery on plea bargaining and restitution, and in trying to
foreclose \Vynn from pursuing any remedy from his illegal and/ or illegally imposed
sentence in the courts falls short of the constitutional mark and does not serve the
State's interest. The State's efforts to maintain the status quo in the face of the illegal
restitution order, and in derogation of the letter and the spirit of the plea agreement,
do not serve any legitimate interest in finality or protect the State or the restitution
victims from any legitimate prejudice. It is in the State's interest for the 60(6) motion
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to go fonvard. Accordingly, the Court should hold that Wynn's 60(b) motion was
filed with reasonable diligence.

v.

THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ORDER

DISCOVERY AND THE STATE SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO
PRODUCE IT.
The State maintains that once the trial court detennined it had no jurisdiction
under 30(b), 22(e) and 60(b), it properly detennined it had no jurisdiction to order
discovery. State's brief at 49-50. This argument does not account for the fact that
the trial court's ruling on 30(b) that there was no error in the judgment, ostensibly
reached the merits during the court's exercise of jurisdiction (R. 508).
As the State does not contest, it has ongoing discovery obligations under
16(b), and ongoing constitutional obligations to produce exculpatory and mitigating
evidence. Compare Wynn's opening brief at 44-45 with State's briefpas.rim. These
obligations were extant during the pendency of Wynn's motions in the trial court, and
should be fulfilled on remand.

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse all aspects of the lower court's ruling and remand

for relief from the illegal restitution order and illegally imposed sentence.
Respectfully submitted this 9th day of May, 2016
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